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Abstract
We conducted a simple resource allocation game known as the ultimatum game (UG) with preschoolers to examine the role
of cognitive and emotional perspective-taking ability on allocation and rejection behavior. A total of 146 preschoolers
played the UG and completed a false belief task and an emotional perspective-taking test. Results showed that cognitive
perspective taking ability had a significant positive effect on the proposer’s offer and a negative effect on the responder’s
rejection behavior, whereas emotional perspective taking ability did not impact either the proposer’s or responder’s
behavior. These results imply that the ability to anticipate the responder’s beliefs, but not their emotional state, plays an
important role in the proposer’s choice of a fair allocation in an UG, and that children who have not acquired theory of mind
still reject unfair offers.
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Introduction
Altruistic behavior between genetically unrelated individuals is a
defining feature of human society [1–3]. Recently, evolutionary
biologists and economists have proposed several theories to
explain human altruism [4–6]. One theory, known as strong
reciprocity, refers to the tendency to punish defectors and reward
cooperators even when there is no future return for the actors [7].
The key argument of this model is that punishment toward
defectors decreases incentives for selfish behavior while encourag-
ing individuals to behave altruistically and fairly toward others. By
employing economic games such as the ultimatum game (UG) [8],
the dictator game, and the public goods game, a large number of
experiments have shown that people tend to care about fairness,
and this tendency is stronger in the presence of peer punishment
[9–12].
The threat of peer punishment has a powerful effect on
cooperative behavior. Using a public goods game, Fehr and
Ga¨chter [9] clearly demonstrated that people are sensitive to peer
punishment. The public goods game is an N-person economic
game in which several players simultaneously decide how much to
contribute to a public fund that pays back based on the collective
endowment. In their study, participants played repeated one-shot
public goods games with and without the opportunity to punish
other players. Cooperation rates of players gradually decreased
when peer punishment was absent but increased when peer
punishment was included. According to participants’ responses to
a post-experimental questionnaire, almost all participants believed
that low contributions to the public good would induce anger in
other players. These results suggest that people anticipate that
other players will become angered by and punish others who do
not cooperate. Other studies have also demonstrated the effect of
the threat of peer punishment in resource-allocation behavior [10–
12].
As illustrated above, people anticipate others’ behaviors to avoid
receiving punishment. Theoretically, the ability to anticipate how
others will respond to one’s own behavior, as well as the ability to
understand the emotions others might experience, play important
roles in maintaining complex human societies. Support for this
claim was first provided by Sally and Hill [13], who conducted an
UG with children with and without autism spectrum disorder
(ASD). The UG is a simple economic game in which two players
are randomly assigned to the role of a proposer or a responder.
First, the proposer receives an endowment from the experimenter
and decides how to divide it between the two players. Next, the
responder decides whether to accept or reject the proposer’s offer;
if they accept the offer, both players receive the portion of the
endowment decided by the proposer. If the responder rejects the
proposer’s decision, both players receive nothing. If the proposer is
motivated to maximize his or her own benefit, he or she should
anticipate how the responder would respond and divide the
endowment in a manner not likely to be rejected by the responder.
The results of Sally and Hill’s study showed that ASD had a
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negative effect on the proposer’s offer: children with ASD tended
to allocate less to the responder than those without ASD did.
It is well known that one of the characteristics of ASD is the lack
of ability to infer others’ mental states (e.g., desires, intentions, and
beliefs) [14]. This ability is known as theory of mind (ToM) [15] or
mentalizing [16]. Generally, in the case of typically developing
children, this ability develops between the ages of four and five
years [17]. Takagishi et al. [18] recently examined the role of
ToM on proposers’ behavior in the UG. In their study, three- and
six-year-old preschoolers played the UG and completed a false
belief task to test their acquisition of ToM. Similar to the results of
Sally and Hill’s study [13], they found that ToM had a significant
positive effect on proposers’ behavior: Children who had acquired
ToM proposed giving more candies to the responders than
children who had not acquired ToM. Furthermore, the effect of
ToM remained even when the effect of age was controlled for.
Preschoolers who had acquired ToM anticipated that the
responder would reject unfair offers and made their allocation
accordingly.
Together, these studies provide strong support for the idea that
ToM, or the cognitive ability to infer the mental states of others,
plays an important role in proposers’ behavior in the UG.
However, a critical question remains: Is the ability to infer
responders’ emotional state (i.e., emotional perspective taking)
sufficient to induce proposers to make a fair offer? Recent
neuroimaging and neuroendocrinological studies have shown that
negative emotions drive the rejection of unfair offers in the UG
[19–21], suggesting that responders experience negative emotion
in response to unfair offers from proposers. In Takagishi et al.’s
study [18], participants completed a false belief task (Sally-Anne
task), which only allowed for the measuring of ‘‘cognitive’’
perspective-taking ability; thus, it is still uncertain whether
proposers actually anticipated responders’ emotional states.
Furthermore, recent studies have shown that different neural
substrates underlie cognitive and emotional perspective taking
[22–24] and that they develop separately [25]. To date, no studies
have examined the role of emotional perspective-taking ability on
proposers’ behavior in the UG or have compared the impact of
emotional perspective-taking ability with that of cognitive
perspective-taking ability. We attempted to do just this in the
current study by examining the roles that cognitive perspective-
taking ability and emotional perspective-taking ability play in
determining proposers’ behavior in the UG. To examine the role
of these abilities, we used performance on a false belief task (Sally-
Figure 1. Images of the experimental apparatus. The proposer sits on the far side and the responder sits on the near side. First, the proposer
makes an offer by dividing stickers between the two (proposer’s and responder’s) trays. Second, the responder decides whether to accept or reject
the offer. If the responder lifts the tray, then both players receive the stickers delegated by the proposer. However, if the responder pushes the lever
supporting the tray, both players receive nothing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108462.g001
Table 1. The eight scenarios in the affective perspective-taking test.
No Emotion Story
1 Happiness A child eats sweets.
2 Happiness A mother tells a child that she will take him or her to the zoo.
3 Sadness A friend causes a child to fall down.
4 Sadness A child’s bicycle has disappeared.
5 Anger A friend has pushed over a desk, which has caused the sweets on the desk to fall off.
6 Anger A mother forces a child to eat a type of food that they hate.
7 Fear A child has a nightmare.
8 Fear A child becomes lost in the forest.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108462.t001
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Anne test) and the affective perspective-taking task developed by
Denham [26]. The latter has two components: an affective
labeling test (ALT) and an affective perspective-taking test (APT).
The ALT measures the ability to understand others’ emotional
states through facial expressions, and the APT measures emotional
perspective-taking ability in a social setting. We focused our
analysis on the latter task and examined the relationship between
the APT scores and behavior in the UG because our primary
interest was emotional perspective taking (inference of another
person’s emotion in a social context) rather than judging another
person’s emotional state from their facial expressions.
It has been well established that adult responders’ rejection of
unfair offers is based on their inference of proposers’ intentions:
Very few adult responders reject an unfair offer in the UG when
they are aware that the unfair offer was made unintentionally by a
proposer whose choice was limited to only unfair offers [27–29].
This finding suggests that inference of intentionality is a
prerequisite for rejecting unfair offers in the UG, and thus,
cognitive perspective-taking ability, but not emotional perspective-
taking ability, should be positively related to rejection behavior.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Parents of participants gave written consent for their preschool-
er’s participation in advance and the committee of Center for
Experimental Research in Social Sciences, Hokkaido University
approved this study.
Participants
A total of 146 preschoolers (78 girls and 68 boys; mean age in
months = 56.0, SD=10.0) participated in the study. Participants
were from three preschool grades: first grade (24 girls and 22 boys;
mean age in months = 44.2, SD=3.2; age range = 38 to 50
months), second grade (28 girls and 24 boys; mean age in
months = 55.9, SD=3.3; age range = 51 to 61 months), and third
grade (26 girls and 22 boys; mean age in months = 67.5, SD=3.8;
age range = 61 to 73 months).
Ultimatum Game
All participants played the UG and completed the Sally-Anne
test [14] as well as Denham’s test [26]. First, seventy-three pairs
matched by sex and grade played a one-shot UG. An
experimenter and two preschoolers were present in the classroom
during the game. In order to make the task simple enough for
preschoolers, we used an experimental apparatus to aid in their
understanding of the UG, and the game was conducted in a face-
to-face setting without anonymity. Half of the participants were
randomly assigned to the role of the proposer and half to the role
of the responder. Non-monetary incentives (stickers) were used.
Stickers have been widely used and their incentive value has been
demonstrated in many studies investigating allocation behavior in
developmental psychology [30–32]. The experimental apparatus
was identical to that used in a previous study [18] (Figure 1). In the
beginning of the game, the experimenter gave ten stickers to the
proposer, who decided how to divide the stickers between
themselves and the responder by placing the stickers on a tray
that was divided into two sections. The proposer placed the
stickers that he or she wanted to keep on the section of the tray
closer to him or herself (proposer’s tray A) and placed the
remaining stickers on the section closer to the responder
(responder’s tray A). After the proposer made his or her allocation
decision by placing the stickers on the tray, the responder decided
whether to accept or reject the proposer’s offer by lifting the tray
or pushing a lever. If the responder lifted the tray, the stickers on
the proposer’s section of the tray slid down a ramp to the
proposer’s side (proposer’s tray B), and those on the responder’s
section slid down to the responder’s side (responder’s tray B). If the
responder pushed the lever that supported the tray, all the stickers
placed on the tray dropped down into a black box and were
confiscated by the experimenter. It was clearly instructed and
demonstrated to participants that once the stickers fell into the
black box, neither the proposer nor the responder would receive
any of them. Before starting the game, the experimenter
demonstrated the tasks of the proposer and the responder to the
children, who were then given the opportunity to practice using
the apparatus several times.
Table 2. Mean scores on Denham’s test by grade.
First Grade Second Grade Third Grade
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Affective Labeling Test 5.33 (1.62) 6.35 (1.63) 7.15 (0.68)
Affective Perspective-taking Test 4.70 (1.68) 5.73 (1.40) 6.85 (1.11)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108462.t002
Table 3. Mean scores of the Affective Perspective-taking Test for participants who passed and those who failed the false belief
task by grade.
First Grade Second Grade Third Grade
N M (SD) N M (SD) N M (SD)
Failed the False Belief Task 42 4.62 (1.74) 29 5.76 (1.60) 13 6.92 (0.86)
Passed the False Belief Task 4 5.50 (0.58) 23 5.70 (1.15) 35 6.83 (1.20)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108462.t003
Cognitive and Emotional Perspective Taking
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False Belief Task
Following the UG, participants engaged in the Sally-Anne task
in order to examine their ability to understand others’ beliefs.
Before the beginning of the test, the experimenter led each
participant individually to an adjacent room to administer the task
on a one-to-one basis. In this commonly used task, participants
view a short video clip on a computer where a child (named
‘‘Natsuki’’ in the Japanese version) stores a ball in a box and leaves
the room. While Natsuki is out of the room, another child, Yuta,
moves the ball into a bag. When Natsuki returns, the participant is
asked where Natsuki will look for the ball. Participants who have
acquired theory of mind should understand that Natsuki would
look in the box where she originally stored her ball. On the other
hand, children who have not yet acquired theory of mind should
assume that Natsuki would look in the bag.
Denham’s Test
Finally, the participants completed Denham’s test in order to
examine their ability to understand others’ emotional states. In the
Affective Labeling Test (ALT), participants were shown four cards
by the experimenter. Pictures of facial expressions of emotion
(happiness, sadness, anger, and fear) were presented on each of the
four cards, one at a time. Participants were then asked to name the
emotion presented on the cards orally. The face cards were laid
out on the floor in front of the participant, who were then asked to
point at the face they showed when they felt happy, sad, angry, or
fear. One point was received for each correct answer.
In the Affective Perspective-taking Test (APT), the experimenter
described eight scenarios to participants by showing an animated
sequence on a laptop PC and asking what emotion another child
would experience in each scenario. Participants were asked to
point to one of the four cards used in the ALT. In each of the eight
scenarios, the protagonist experienced one of four emotions:
happiness, sadness, anger, or fear (Table 1). Participants received
one point per correct answer.
Relationship Quality
In our experiment, two players played the UG in a face-to-face
setting without anonymity. As relationship quality can play an
important role in pro-social behavior [32], we asked the students’
teachers to rate the relationship of each of the 73 pairs on a 7 point
scale (1 = very bad relationship to 7= very good relationship) in
order to examine the effect of the quality of any pre-existing
relationship between the proposer and responder.
Results
False Belief Task and Denham’s Test
In total, four out of 46 first-grade preschoolers (9%), 23 out of
52 second-grade preschoolers (44%), and 35 out of 48 third-grade
preschoolers (73%) passed the false belief task. The success rates of
the false belief task were positively correlated with age in months
(r= .55, p,.0001). The mean scores on Denham’s test by grade
are shown in Table 2. Similar to the false belief task, the scores of
ALT and APT were positively correlated with age in months
(ALT, r= .51, p,.0001; APT, r= .53, p,.0001). Next, we
examined the relationship between cognitive perspective taking
(Sally-Anne task) and emotional perspective taking (APT). The
mean scores of the APT for participants who passed and those who
failed the false belief task are shown in Table 3. An ANOVA with
grade (first grade, second grade, and third grade) and performance
on the false belief task (passed, failed) as factors indicated a
significant main effect of grade (F(2, 145) = 11.26, p,.0001,
g2 = .12), but no main effect of performance on the false belief task
(F(1, 145) = 0.57, p= .45, g2 = .00) or interaction effect (F(2,
145) = 0.71, p= .49, g2 = .01). These results imply that while both
cognitive and emotional perspective taking develop with age, they
also develop independently.
Proposers’ Offers to Responders
The mean number of stickers offered to responders by grade is
shown in Table 4, and the distribution of proposers’ offers by
grade is shown in Figure 2. To examine the effects of cognitive
and emotional perspective taking on the number of stickers offered
to responders, we conducted a series of multiple regression
analyses (Table 5). First, in Model 1, we regressed the number of
offers to responders on age in months and sex (male = 0,
female = 1) and found that age had a significant effect on the
number of stickers (b= .37, p,.01), but sex did not (b= .14,
p = .20). In Model 2, we added the APT, and found that it had no
significant effect (b= .02, p = .91). In Model 3, we replaced APT
Table 4. Mean size of offer from proposers who passed and those who failed the false belief task by grade.
First Grade Second Grade Third Grade
N M (SD) N M (SD) N M (SD)
Failed the False Belief Task 23 0.48 (1.59) 15 1.07 (1.94) 9 1.67 (2.50)
Passed the False Belief Task 0 - 11 2.36 (2.58) 15 3.73 (3.06)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108462.t004
Figure 2. Distribution of proposers’ offers by grade.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108462.g002
Cognitive and Emotional Perspective Taking
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with the false belief task (failed the false belief task = 0, passed the
false belief task = 1) and found that the false belief task had a
significant effect (b= .27, p,.05). In Model 4, both the false belief
task and APT were included as independent variables, and we
found that the effect of the false belief task remained significant
(b= .27, p,.05), but the effect of the APT remained non-
significant (b= .02, p = .90). The significant main effect of age in
months found in Model 1 had also reduced to non-significance
(b= .25, p = .11), suggesting that the increase in stickers offered to
the responder was mediated by cognitive perspective-taking
ability. In Model 5, we added the quality of the relationship in
each of the 73 pairs as another independent variable. The results
showed that the effect of the false belief task remained significant
(b= .29, p,.05), but the effects of age (b= .24, p= .12), sex
(b= .11, p = .32), APT (b= .01, p = .93), and the quality of
relationship (b=–.06, p = .62) were not significant. Together, the
results indicate that cognitive perspective-taking ability, but not
emotional perspective-taking ability, played an important role in
the proposer’s behavior in the UG.
Responders’ Decisions
The size of the offers from the proposer was negatively
correlated with rejection behavior (r=–.46, p,.0001), suggesting
that unfair offers were likely to be rejected by the responders.
Rejection rates for each offer are shown in Figure 3. To examine
the role of cognitive and emotional perspective taking on
responders’ rejection of unfair offers, we conducted a logistic
regression analyses. We used the behavior of the responder as a
dependent variable (acceptance of unfair offer = 0, rejection of
unfair offer = 1) and age in month, sex (female = 0, male = 1), the
score of APT, false belief task (failed the false belief task = 0, passed
the false belief task = 1), and relationship quality as independent
variables. As shown in Table 6, while emotional perspective-taking
ability had no effect on rejection of unfair offers, cognitive
perspective-taking ability had a weakly negative effect on rejection
of unfair offers. The implications of this important finding are
discussed below.
Discussion
Our results showed that cognitive perspective-taking ability has
a significant positive effect on the proposer’s offer and a negative
effect on the responder’s rejection behavior, while emotional
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Figure 3. Rejection rates for each offer.
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perspective-taking ability did not have any effect on either the
proposer’s or the responder’s behavior. These results imply that
the ability to anticipate the responder’s beliefs (such as under-
standing that the responder will reject unfair offers) plays an
important role in the proposer’s choice of a fair allocation in the
UG, while understanding of emotional states per se does not play a
significant role in determining allocation or rejection behavior in
the UG.
While surprising, the lack of an effect of emotional perspective
taking observed in our study is consistent with implications of a
recent brain-lesion study which found that activity in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was related to emotional
perspective-taking ability but not cognitive perspective-taking
ability [22–24]. Given this finding, patients with damaged vmPFC
are expected to have low levels of emotional perspective-taking
and unaffected levels of cognitive perspective-taking ability.
Nevertheless, one neuroeconomic study found that the mean
amount offered in an UG by patients with damaged vmPFC did
not differ from those observed among patients with undamaged
vmPFC [33]. These findings suggest that the lack of emotional
perspective taking due to vmPFC damage does not affect the
proposer’s offers in the UG. Thus, we consider our finding–that
cognitive perspective-taking, but not emotional-perspective taking,
is critical in making a fair offer in the UG–to be important for
understanding the role of ToM, particularly cognitive perspective-
taking ability, in the development of fairness-related behavior in
children. However, it is premature to specify the exact reason that
emotional perspective taking was not related to the proposer’s
offer. One possible reason might be that emotional perspective
taking is not directly related to the prediction of others’ behavior.
Those who scored high on the APT understood that the responder
would get angry if they made an unfair offer, yet they might not
understand that the anger would cause the responder to reject
their offer. This inference may require cognitive perspective-taking
ability.
Another notable result of this study is that cognitive perspective-
taking ability appeared to inhibit the responder’s rejection of
unfair offers in the UG. On the surface, this finding contradicts the
well-established finding that adult responders reject unfair offers to
punish proposer’s selfish intentions [27,28], as well as the finding
that the rejection rate of unfair offers in older children is higher
than rates observed in younger children [34]. As these studies
suggest that cognitive perspective taking ability should enhance the
rejection of unfair offers, it is puzzling that children who had
cognitive perspective-taking ability did not reject unfair offers. We
suspect that in the case of the current study, because the two
players belonged to same class and the UG was conducted in a
face-to-face setting, children who had developed cognitive
perspective taking ability may have accepted unfair offers to avoid
damaging their relationship with their classmate. However, as
children who have not yet developed cognitive perspective taking
ability cannot infer the mental states of the proposer, they would
be less likely to seek to maintain relationship harmony by
accepting unfair offers. Indeed, the two players in a previous
study examining preschool aged children [34] did not know one
another, and experiments employing the UG in adults are
generally conducted in completely anonymity. Thus, in order to
examine the psychological foundations of the rejection of unfair
offers in children, further research is needed to compare the
rejection rates between completely anonymous and in face-to-face
settings.
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